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Controversy exists as to whether semantic disruption in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) systematically impairs the naming
of living things. Moreover, little is known about performance across more specific subcategories. We investigated
picture naming in 28 AD patients and 24 controls. To deal with nonnormal distributions, we created 1,000 boot-
strap hierarchical regressions and determined which variables (the “nuisance” variables familiarity, word
frequency, age of acquisition and visual complexity; category; and control naming) best predicted AD patient
naming. Nuisance variables combined, control naming, and category uniquely accounted for 39%, 36%, and 3%
of patient naming variance, respectively. Finally, analysis of the AD naming profile across the 10 subcategories
mirrored that of controls. Taken together, these findings indicate that while AD naming is, of course, quantita-
tively worse than that of controls, it does not qualitatively differ—that is, it is an exaggerated normal profile.
Keywords: Category specific; Alzheimer’s disease; Bootstrap; Picture naming; Control; Superordinate.
INTRODUCTION
Object naming in patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(AD) is impaired relative to age-matched healthy
elderly controls (e.g., Chertkow & Bub; 1992;
Laws, Gale, Leeson, & Crawford, 2005); and the
types of naming error made by AD patients (e.g.,
overextending the names of within-category associ-
ate items and producing the superordinate, rather
than basic or subordinate level name for an item)
are widely believed to reflect progressive deteriora-
tion in semantic memory function (Chertkow &
Bub, 1992; Done & Gale, 1997). Semantic memory
impairment is an early marker of AD, being detect-
able even in mild cognitive impairment cases—that
is, in pre-AD neuropathology (Adlam, Bozeat,
Arnold, Watson, & Hodges, 2006; Garrard et al.,
2001; Vogel, Gade, Stokolm, & Waldemar, 2005).
There has been increasing interest in recent
years as to whether AD systematically inflicts a
category-specific impairment in semantic memory.
In line with the broader literature on category-
specific deficits, most studies in AD have focused
on the relative impairment of living over nonliving
categories. In a recent meta-analysis of 21 picture-
naming studies involving 557 AD patients and 509
healthy controls, Laws, Adlington, Gale, Moreno-
Martínez, and Sartori (2007) found AD patients to
be impaired at naming items from both living and
nonliving categories. Although more studies
revealed deficits for living than nonliving things
(13:8), no significant difference emerged between
the effect sizes for living and nonliving things.
Minimally, this casts a certain amount of doubt on
the notion that AD patients suffer from a relative
impairment in naming living things, although the
question remains as to why some studies report
category effects in AD, whereas others do not.
One problem with comparing previous picture-
naming studies in AD is the considerable variability
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in the number and types of living and nonliving
stimuli used by different researchers. For example,
Laws et al. (2007) report that studies have used a
wide range of 20–120 items. Although Laws et al.
(2007) found that the number of stimulus items did
not significantly predict effect sizes for either living
or nonliving things, the emergence of category
effects may still depend crucially on the specific
choice of items used. In this context, the question
of whether living or nonliving impairments reflect
impoverished naming across the majority of sub-
categories within either domain (living or nonliv-
ing), or only a small subset, has not been
systematically investigated in previous studies. The
number of living and nonliving subcategories, as
well as the specific choice of items representing
each subcategory, may therefore influence the
presence and direction of emergent category effects
(Aronoff et al., 2006).
Tippett, Grossman, and Farah (1996) showed
that the emergence of a group category effect in
AD patients was contingent on whether or not
stimuli were matched across living and nonliving
things on so-called “nuisance variables” (e.g.,
familiarity, visual complexity, word-frequency,
and so on). Subsequently, recent studies of cate-
gory specificity in AD have taken great care to
match living and nonliving stimuli on as many rel-
evant nuisance variables as possible (for a fuller
exposition of the degree of variable matching, see
Moreno-Martínez & Laws, 2007). Given the level
of discord between living and nonliving things on
nearly all such variables (Barbarotto, Capitani, &
Laiacona, 2001; Gale & Laws, 2006), the choice of
items available for inclusion in matched sets of
pictures is reduced, especially when stimuli are
drawn from a single source such as the Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980) corpus. For example, liv-
ing things in the Snodgrass and Vanderwart cor-
pus are typically less familiar and have lower word
frequency and higher visual complexity than non-
living things, and so there is an inherent bias,
when matching between living and nonliving
domains, to exclude living-thing items that might
exaggerate this tendency (and to include less
familiar nonliving things that counter the bias).
Consequently, some items and subcategories are
more widely represented in studies of AD naming
than others. A useful approach when comparing
living and nonliving things may therefore be to
match within each domain for the number of dif-
ferent subcategories (fruits, vegetables, clothing,
tools, etc.) and also the number of items represent-
ing each subcategory. A more detailed analysis of
AD naming error profiles across a range of sub-
categories within living and nonliving domains is
also required for a more specific test of some mod-
els of category specificity.
Additionally, the relative level of naming accu-
racy in healthy control groups, with respect to
patients, can strongly affect the profile of patient
impairment when the two groups are compared
statistically. A series of experiments examining
category specific naming in AD by Laws et al.
(2005) showed that the emergence of a category
effect and, perhaps more importantly, the direc-
tion of the effect, was modulated by the overall
performance of the control group. Most healthy
control subjects perform close to ceiling level in
standard object-naming tasks, and this is espe-
cially so for studies that have presented stimuli
from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) corpus
(see Laws et al., 2007). Indeed, the vast majority of
studies examining picture naming in AD, and
other neuropathologies, have selected their stimuli
from this corpus (see Laws, 2005, for a discus-
sion). Ceiling level performance of control partici-
pants invalidates some important assumptions of
statistical tests that compare control and patient
group variances (Laws, 2005; Laws et al., 2005;
Laws, Leeson, & Gale, 2003). Methods of data
analysis that do not succumb to problems with
nonnormal distributions are therefore essential,
and bootstrap methods comprise one such alterna-
tive set of approaches for dealing with such data
(e.g., Moreno-Martínez & Laws, 2007). These
methods, which require far fewer assumptions
than standard parametric tests, are suitable in cir-
cumstances where many zero data points exist in
the dataset (e.g., controls who score very highly,
or patients who perform at, or near, floor level).
With bootstrap techniques, a relevant test statistic
(t, F, r, etc.) is selected, and this statistic is then
computed for n bootstrap samples—that is, n per-
mutations of the original group data. When this
occurs with replacement, each data point returns
to the sampling pool and may be redrawn numer-
ous times. After many permutations, this results in
a distribution of test statistics (rather than data
points), which can be analyzed. Hence bootstrap
methods may be applied to data that have been
collected using traditional, easy-to-name, stimuli,
even when ceiling effects are present (Delucchi &
Bostrom, 2004).
In this study, we compared the object naming
profiles of 28 probable AD patients and 24 healthy
elderly control participants. We used a set of 100
pictures drawn from the Snodgrass and Vander-
wart (1980) corpus, which was specifically selected
to control for the number of living and nonliving
subcategories (i.e., animals, birds, clothing, furni-
ture, etc.) and also the number of items representing
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each of those subcategories. The pictures are
matched across domain (living vs. nonliving) for
familiarity, word frequency, and visual complexity.
We used bootstrap hierarchical regression analyses
to establish the best predictors for the AD naming
profile, and we also examined the naming profile
of patients and controls across subcategories.
METHOD
Materials
A total of 100 pictures depicting items from 10 dif-
ferent subcategories were selected from the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) corpus. We used
the grayscale versions of these stimuli that have
been created by Rossion and Pourtois (2004), and
which contain greater amounts of surface texture
than the original line drawings. Items were selected
from 5 living-thing subcategories (animals, birds,
body parts, fruit, and vegetables) and 5 nonliving
subcategories (clothing, furniture, musical items,
tools, and vehicles), with 10 different items repre-
senting each subcategory. The pictures were pre-
sented on laminated cards of approximately 10
cm2. Living and nonliving things were matched
for: concept familiarity (3.24 ± 1.01 vs. 3.53 ± 0.87),
F(1, 98) = 2.41, p > .1; visual complexity (3.01 ±
0.93 vs. 3.03 ± 0.85), F(1, 98) < 1, p > .9; and log
word frequency (1.11 ± 0.64 vs. 1.13 ± 0.75), F(1,
98) < 1, p = .88; from Kuçera & Francis, 1967), but
not for age of acquisition (3.6 ± 1.04 vs. 3.41 ±
1.18), F(1, 98) = 4.29, p = .04. This set of stimuli is
also reported in Gale and Laws (2006), and Gale,
Laws, and Foley (2006), and a list of all items
appears in the Appendix.
Participants
Patients
A total of 28 patients with probable AD were
recruited from a consecutive series of attendees at
an outpatients’ memory clinic in the United King-
dom. All participants had been assessed for proba-
ble AD using National Institute of Clinical
Effectiveness (NICE) criteria for diagnosis of AD
(NICE, 2007) which includes elimination of other
possible pathologies by means of detailed assess-
ment of history/onset, detailed neuropsychological
assessment, and, in some cases, neuroimaging. Any
patients who were judged by their treating consult-
ant not to have capacity to give informed consent
were excluded. All included patients had normal, or
corrected-to-normal, vision, and all spoke English
as their first language. The AD group comprised 9
males and 19 females, and mean age was 83.3 years
(SD = 6.9; range = 71–98 years). The average Mini
Mental State Examination (MMSE: Folstein, Fol-
stein, & McHugh, 1975) score was 22.1 (SD = 4.5;
range = 14–30). One individual with probable AD
scored 30 on the MMSE at the time of testing (all
others scored less than 28). However, this person
presented with marked anomia and had been given
a probable diagnosis of AD by her treating clini-
cian, so we included her in the study on this basis.
Mean predicted premorbid IQ score for the group
(derived from National Adult Reading Test,
NART, scores: Nelson, 1982) was 109.4 (±7.6;
range 95–119).
Controls
A total of 24 elderly control participants (13
male, 11 female) of mean age 78 (SD = 6) years
were recruited. Although controls and AD patients
were not matched exactly on age, this factor was
accounted for in later analyses. The controls were
recruited through their general practitioner, who
had screened them for good health. All were
healthy, had no history of cognitive impairment,
psychiatric illness, any form of brain injury, or
alcohol or drug abuse. All had normal, or cor-
rected-to-normal, eyesight, and all spoke English
as their first language.
Procedure
The study was ethically approved by the National
Health Service (NHS) Hertfordshire Research Eth-
ics Committee. The majority of participants
(patients and controls) completed the naming task
in their own homes, seated comfortably at a table.
The picture cards were presented, one at a time, in
a pseudorandomly determined order, and the par-
ticipant was asked to name each item in turn. The
exact response was recorded verbatim on a
response sheet for later scoring. The pictures were
presented in two blocks, each of 50 cards, with a
short break between blocks.
Where a picture could legitimately be referred to
by more than one name (e.g., sailboat/yacht,
chicken/hen, sofa/couch, lorry/truck, etc.), the
alternative names were accepted as correct. Simi-
larly, when presented in such a stylized format,
some items were difficult to distinguish from visu-
ally similar associates, (e.g., violin/viola, cabbage/
lettuce). In such cases, either name was accepted as
correct. Finally, items that were named at a more
specific level (e.g., “overcoat” for coat; “trilby” for
hat) were accepted as correct provided that the
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subordinate level name given was appropriate to
the specific depiction of the item. Responses were
scored by two raters (T.G. and K.I.), and a consen-
sus was reached by discussion for any items where
the raters had disagreed.
RESULTS
Living versus nonliving
AD patients named significantly more nonliving
(mean = 81.3%, SD = 19.3%) than living items
(mean = 71.6%, SD = 25.6%), F(1, 98) = 4.59, p =
.035. Controls named slightly more nonliving
(mean = 96%, SD = 9.4%) than living items (mean
= 95%, SD = 10%) but the difference did not reach
significance, F(1, 98) < 1.
We computed skewness and kurtosis statistics
(g1 and g2) for both the patient and the healthy
control data. For patients, skewness was –1.17,
and kurtosis was 0.73. D’Agostino, Belanger, and
D’Agostino’s (1990) test for skewness failed to
reject the null hypothesis that the distribution was
symmetrical: zg1 = –4.2. Further, the D’Agostino–
Pearson omnibus test for normality, which uses
both g1 and g2 as input, revealed that the distribu-
tion did differ significantly from normality: K2 =
19.8, p < .0001. For the controls, skewness was –
3.10, and kurtosis was 10.81. D’Agostino et al.’s
test for skewness failed to reject the null hypothesis
that the distribution was symmetrical: zg1 = –7.6.
Further, the D’Agostino–Pearson omnibus test for
normality revealed that the distribution differed
significantly from normality: K2 = 88.1, p < .0001.
Given that all the variables we examined corre-
lated with patient naming (Table 1), we used a
bootstrap multiple regression to estimate the
degree of variance in the AD patient naming data
that was explained by each predictor (familiarity,
word frequency, age of acquisition, visual com-
plexity, category—living vs. nonliving—and con-
trol naming performance). We created 1,000
bootstrap samples, each equal in size to the origi-
nal sample and each using random, with-replace-
ment, sampling. One single bootstrap sample
might therefore contain multiple instances of a sin-
gle data point and no instances of a different data
point. Multiple hierarchical regressions were run
for each of the 1,000 bootstrap samples to deter-
mine the contribution of each predictor in explaining
the outcome variance within each model. Table 2
shows the contribution of each predictor variable
in accounting for naming in the AD patients.
Each hierarchical regression analysis included
three blocks of predictors. In Model 1, we entered
the so-called “nuisance variables” (familiarity,
word frequency, age of acquisition, and visual
complexity) together in Block 1, followed by “cat-
egory” in Block 2, and finally “control perform-
ance” in Block 3 (Table 2, Model 1). This revealed
that the nuisance variables accounted for 39% of
the variance in patient naming. Category (living
vs. nonliving) was also significant, accounting for
10% of variance after controlling for the nuisance
variables. Finally, control performance was
highly significant and accounted for almost 30%
of the remaining variance after controlling both
for the effects of nuisance variables and for the
effects of category. Finally, the 1,000 boot-
strapped hierarchical regression analyses were
rerun, but this time changing the order of steps to:
“nuisance variables,” “control performance,” and
finally “category” to determine the amount of
variance attributable to category after controlling
for nuisance variables and the naming difficulty
index, as measured by control naming perform-
ance (Table 2, Model 2). Here category accounted
for only a small (3%), though significant, amount
of patient naming variance after controlling for
all of the nuisance variables and the difficulty
index for controls (R2 change = .36, p < .0001). In
combination, these hierarchical regression analy-
ses revealed that category and control difficulty
accounted, respectively, for 3–10% and 29–36% of
the variance in AD naming.
TABLE 1 
Correlations between AD naming and nuisance variables
VC AA WF Control naming Category AD naming
Familiarity –.40*** –.69*** .40*** .30** .16 .51***
Visual comp — .39*** –.16 –.11 .01 –.22*
AA — –.52*** –.43*** .22* –.59***
WF (log) — .17 .01 .38***
Cont. Naming — .10 .79***
Category — .21*
Note. AD = Alzheimer’s disease. VC = visual complexity. AA = age of acquisition. WF = word frequency.
Probability two-tails : *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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More closely matched samples
Recent work shows that the sex of participants
may interact with semantic category, both for
patients and for healthy participants. In particular,
men show better performance with some nonliving
subcategories, while women show an advantage
with some living subcategories (for reviews, see
Gainotti, 2005; Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Capitani,
2006). Because our groups were not closely
matched for sex ratio, we reran the analyses on a
subset of patients and controls who were closely
matched:1 18 AD patients (9 male, 9 female) with a
mean age 79.6 years and 22 elderly controls (11
male, 11 female) with a mean age 79 years. We also
removed the one AD patient with a MMSE score
of 30. The bootstrap analyses did not differ from
those described above for the full sample (see
Table 3).
Subcategories
The profiles of subcategory naming for AD
patients and controls are displayed in Figure 1.
Body parts were named most accurately by patients
and controls, a pattern that is not typical of the
overall living-thing naming profile. Similarly, the
naming of musical instruments was more consistent
with the naming accuracy levels observed in several
of the living-thing subcategories.
The range of item accuracies for AD patients
was 10.7% to 100%. The least accurately named
(all below 40%) were: artichoke, pepper, pumpkin,
French horn, cherry, eagle, peach, guitar, ostrich,
and asparagus (notably, all living things or musi-
cal items). The most accurately named (all at
100%) were: banana, bike, bird, bed, car, hammer,
foot, hat, trousers, lips, dog, chair, shoe, scissors,
and ear.
After Z-transforming the within-group naming
performance for AD patients and for elderly con-
trols, a remarkably similar profile of naming
emerged in the two groups (Figure 2). This sug-
gests that the levels of difficulty shown by controls
are exaggerated in AD patients and that this pat-
tern emerges consistently across all subcategories.
For example, both groups clearly found vegetables
and musical instruments the most difficult to name
subcategories; and both found body parts and
clothing the easiest to name.
DISCUSSION
This study examined two issues that may underpin
inconsistent findings in the study of category spe-
cific semantic impairments in AD. First, we exam-
ined the influence of the so called “nuisance
variables,” which are known to differ across living
and nonliving domains. Second, and more impor-
tantly, we examined the treatment of control data
and the associated problem of ceiling effects. We
proposed the use of bootstrap analyses as a solu-
tion: As noted, bootstrap techniques are one way
to circumvent the problems associated with non-
normal distributions, which often emerge when
contrasting neurologically impaired and unim-
paired groups (Delucchi & Bostrom, 2004).
1Unfortunately information about length of education was
not available for patients or controls.
TABLE 2 
Results of 1,000 bootstrap regression analyses using two 
different hierarchical models
Model Step Variable R2 ∆R2 p
1 1 Familiarity, visual 
complexity, word fre-
quency, and AoA
.39 .39
2 Category .49 .10 .0052
3 Control naming .78 .29 <.0001
Overall model 
adjusted R2
.78
2 1 Familiarity, visual 
complexity, word fre-
quency, and AoA
.39 .39
2 Control naming .75 .36 <.0001
3 Category .78 .03 .02
Note. AoA = age of acquisition.
TABLE 3 
Results of 1,000 bootstrap regression analyses on a subset 
of closely matched patient and control samples using two 
different hierarchical models
Model Step Variable R2 ∆R2 p
1 1 Familiarity, visual 
complexity, word 
frequency, and 
AoA
.33 .33
2 Category .45 .11 .004
3 Control naming .74 .30 <.0001
Overall model 
adjusted R2
.78
2 1 Familiarity, visual 
complexity, word 
frequency, and 
AoA
.33 .33
2 Control naming .70 .37 <.0001
3 Category .74 .04 .02
Note. AoA = age of acquisition.
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Many studies have now investigated category-
specific naming performance in AD using rigor-
ously controlled stimuli; however, their findings
are not wholly consistent (for a review, see Laws et
al., 2007). Although most reports of category-
specific impairments in AD patients record living-
thing impairments (e.g., Grossman, Robinson,
Biassou, White-Devine, & D’Esposito, 1998;
Mauri, Daum, Sartori, Riesch, & Birbaumer, 1994;
Silveri, Daniele, Giustolisi, & Gainotti, 1991), oth-
ers describe both living and nonliving deficits
within the same group of patients (Gonnerman,
Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997;
Laws et al., 2005; Laws et al., 2003; Moreno-
Martínez, Tallón-Barranco, & Frank-García, 2007;
Tippett et al., 1996; Zannino, Perri, Carlesimo,
Pasqualetti, & Caltagirone, 2002). Furthermore,
Laws et al’s (2007) meta-analysis of category-
specific picture naming in AD patients highlighted
the fact that while more studies have reported sig-
nificant category effects for living things, the effect
sizes for living and nonliving things did not signifi-
cantly differ. The greater number of previous stud-
ies reporting living-thing impairments has,
perhaps, encouraged the impression that AD
patients show a differential living-thing category
disadvantage. In concurrence with most previous
studies, we found that AD patients named signifi-
cantly fewer living than nonliving things and, fur-
thermore, that this could not be readily attributed
to any differences in nuisance variables (at least
those that were matched statistically across living
and nonliving domains).
As with many similar studies of picture naming
in AD that have used the Snodgrass and Vander-
wart (1980) images, the data from our healthy con-
trols were at ceiling and may have therefore
masked any “normal” category effect—especially
since the patient data were also nonnormally dis-
tributed. What is almost certain is that any conven-
tional statistical comparison of the AD and control
groups may well have led to an unreliable conclusion
Figure 1. Mean naming (percentage) for Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients and elderly healthy controls in five living and five nonliving
subcategories. Bars = standard errors.
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regarding the size and direction of category effects in
these patients (see Laws, 2005; Laws et al., 2005).
As we have argued, bootstrap analyses address
some of the problems associated with heavily
skewed distributions, and, in the current study, we
used bootstrap hierarchical regression analyses to
determine the specific roles played by three types
of variable (nuisance variables per se, a control
group difficulty index, and category). As already
noted, the use of unmatched stimuli has been high-
lighted as one possible reason why patients may
show poorer performance with living than nonliv-
ing things in some previous studies (Tippett et al.,
1996). Although we matched items across category
(living vs. nonliving) on some nuisance variables
(familiarity, visual complexity, log word fre-
quency), these variables, combined with age of
acquisition, still accounted for a large proportion
of the variance in patient naming (39%).
The persistence of a significant, albeit small, cat-
egory effect, even after controlling for nuisance
variables, does not alone confirm that the category
effect is a consequence of the neurological damage.
Rather, it is also vital to establish whether the cate-
gory effect is larger than that which might be
expected in healthy controls. A large amount of
variance in patient naming was uniquely explained
by the difficulty index derived from elderly healthy
controls (approximately 29%). By contrast,
although category did significantly predict patient
naming, it uniquely accounted for just 3% of the
variance after controlling for the other variables
(i.e., 10 times less than the control difficulty index).
While we would not argue that the direction and
size of this difference in controls would invariably
occur across different stimulus sets, the level and
direction of difficulty that exists for healthy con-
trols must be established on any specific stimulus
set being used.
Both the regression analyses and, furthermore,
the profile across subcategories indicate that
despite the obvious quantitative difference between
patient and control performance, they do not differ
qualitatively. As far as we are aware, no previous
study has examined such a broad range of catego-
ries in AD patients, at least with respect to picture
naming. Critically, the AD patients and healthy
controls showed similar difficulty profiles across the
five living and the five nonliving categories. For exam-
ple, although AD patients show greater difficulty with
Figure 2. Standardized Z-profiles for Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients and elderly healthy controls across five living and five
nonliving subcategories.
460
465
470
475
480
485
490
495
500
505
8 GALE ET AL.
naming vegetables, this was also the most difficult
category for controls to name. Notably both
groups show substantial naming variability across
subcategories, and this again underscores the
importance of stimulus choice when examining cat-
egory effects. As with previous studies (Barbarotto
et al., 2001; Gale & Laws 2006; Gale et al., 2006;
Laws, Gale, Frank, & Davey, 2002a), body parts
and musical instruments appear to be atypically
good and poor when referenced to living and non-
living categories, respectively, both for AD patients
and for controls. In other words, naming in AD
patients reflects a similar pattern of task difficulty
expressed by healthy elderly controls.
Our findings are consistent with the patient per-
formance being an exaggeration of normal healthy
control performance (see Moreno-Martínez &
Laws, 2007, in press; Perri et al., 2003). The pres-
ence of a considerable category effect in neurologi-
cally normal participants may well have been
“hidden” by ceiling effects in the control data of
previous studies. Indeed, the presence of a normal
category advantage (whether living or nonliving)
accords with recent findings in healthy participants
(Brousseau & Buchanan, 2004; Coppens &
Frisinger, 2005; Filliter, McMullen, & Westwood,
2004; Låg, 2005; Låg, Hveem, Ruud, & Laeng,
2006; Laws, 1999, 2000; Laws & Hunter, 2006;
Laws & Neve, 1999; Laws, Leeson, & Gale, 2002b;
Lloyd-Jones & Luckhurst, 2002; McKenna &
Parry, 1994). With the recent accumulation of
studies documenting category effects in healthy
participants, it is pertinent to ask whether, and
indeed how, extant models of category specificity
incorporate the notion of category effects in the
healthy brain.
Current models of category specificity have been
designed to specifically account for patient deficits
rather than to make predictions about normal cat-
egory effects, and so may not make obvious predic-
tions about category effects in normal cognition.
The closest to a normal model is, indeed, the arti-
factual (nuisance variable) account, and this would
typically predict a nonliving advantage, though not
of course for matched stimuli. Although the
“domain-specific” account (Caramazza & Shel-
ton, 1998) does not make specific predictions
about normal category biases, we might expect the
preferential processing of those categories that
have dedicated domains (e.g., foodstuffs, animals,
tools) in neurologically unimpaired individuals (see
Laws, 2000). Our data provide no evidence of dif-
ferential impairment in any subcategory of living
or nonliving domains. This suggests that the nam-
ing of AD patients reflects the same pattern of task
difficulty as that seen in healthy elderly controls—that
is, there are no qualitative differences attributable
to the disease process itself. Rather, at least within
the context of AD, the disease process affects cate-
gories in an additive manner, rather than selec-
tively affecting specific neural subsystems of
knowledge. Whatever predictions may or may not
be derived from extant models of category specifi-
city, this study underlines the importance of exam-
ining the performance of neurologically healthy
participants when documenting category-specific
naming deficits in neurological patients, and the
need for models of category specificity to address
the finding of normal category effects.
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LIST OF STIMULI USED
Animals: bear, cow, dog, elephant, giraffe, goat,
horse, lion, sheep, squirrel
Birds: bird, chicken, duck, eagle, ostrich, owl,
peacock, penguin, rooster, swan
Body parts: arm, ear, eye, finger, foot, hand, leg,
lips, nose, toes
Clothing: coat, dress, hat, jacket, pants, shirt,
shoe, skirt, sock, sweater
Fruit: apple, banana, cherry, grapes, lemon,
orange, peach, pear, pineapple, strawberry
Furniture: bed, chair, couch, desk, dresser,
fridge, rocking-chair, stool, table, TV
Musical instruments: accordion, bell, drum,
flute, French horn, guitar, harp, piano, trumpet,
violin
Tools: axe, chisel, hammer, paintbrush, pliers,
ruler, saw, scissors, screwdriver, wrench
Vegetables: artichoke, asparagus, carrot, celery,
lettuce, mushroom, onion, pepper, potato, pumpkin
Vehicles: airplane, bicycle, bus, car, helicopter,
motorbike, sailboat, train, truck, wagon
760
765
770
775
780
